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      ABSTRACT- Next Generation Networks (NGN) focuses to 
improve the telecommunication core and access networks and 
plan to transport all the services by encapsulating them into 
packets via a single IP based network. IP Multimedia 
Subsystem (IMS) serves as a Service Delivery Platform for 
NGN. Conference, one of the main services provided by the 
IMS, allows the multiple users to communicate at a time. This 
service is subject to various types of flooding attacks (i.e. 
Invite Flooding Attack, REGISTER flooding attacks etc), 
internal threats (i.e. SQL Injection) and session based attacks 
(Session teardown attack, session modification attack etc). 
Moreover a single participant of the conference service is fully 
authorized to refer any number of other participants. It can 
result in dissatisfaction and conflict among the existing 
participants of the conference. The referred participant 
becomes the fully authorized member of the conference which 
limits the applicability of the conference service in the real life. 
To mitigate the effect of flooding attacks and internal threats 
we developed an Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) 
system. Election based distributed referring authority 
mechanism is proposed to handle the conflict arise due to the 
single participant based referring. To span the scope of the 
conference service in maximum number of real life scenarios 
parameterized refer request is introduced in the paper. 
Results are validated through deployment of the proposed 
solution over IMS testbed.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In future it is planned that all the telecommunication core 
and access networks will use IP for the transportation.  The 
kind of network in which traffic of all access networks will 
be transported through IP packet encapsulation is known as 
Next Generation Networks (NGN).  IP Multimedia 
Subsystem (IMS) provides architecture for fixed mobile 
convergence that includes variety of protocols. Session 
Initiation Protocol (SIP) is one of the main protocols of the 
IMS 
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A. IMS  Architecture 
 
 
 IMS can be divided into three layers. The lower layer or 
layer one is called as user plan and it accommodates all the 
IMS users who want to use different IMS services. In order 
to obtain services an IMS user contacts the layer two known 
as IMS core where authentication and authorization takes 
place. IMS core mainly consists of Call Session Control 
Functions (CSCFs) and databases. Proxy Call Session 
Control Function (P-CSCF) acts as entry point to IMS core 
and forwards the request to Interrogating Call Session 
Control Function (I-CSCF), I-CSCF locates the appropriate 
Serving Call Session Control Function (S-CSCF) from the 
databases and forwards request to it. S-CSCF performs 
authentication by downloading the authentication data from 
Home Subscriber Server (HSS) and then forwards the 
request to application server if required. The upper most 
layer or layer three contains the application servers to 
provide different kind of services. In this research paper our 
focus is on Conference server upon which conference 
service is deployed. 
  
B.       IMS conference Service 
 
 
A conference is a service that allows multiple users to 
communicate at a time. The conference involves audio, 
video, or text conference (chatting) [1]. A conference can 
be loosely, fully distributed or tightly coupled. In this paper 
our focus is on tightly coupled conference that is controlled 
by a central point. This central point is responsible to 
provide services like transcoding, media mixing, 
notification etc. In IMS conference this central point is 
called “focus” and it setups a signaling dialogue among all 
participants. The set of rules related to a conference is 
known as conference policy. Rules may be related to the 
membership, access control, usage etc. A server that creates 
a new conference by assigning it a Universal Resource 
Identifier (URI) is known as conference factory. Figure 1 
shows the conference creation.  
 
A short lived conference that is created without scheduling 
is known as ad-hoc conference. For scheduled conference 
we need conference control protocols those are still under 
researched in IMS. So, our focus is on ad-hoc conferences. 
In order to invite someone to the conference service a Refer 
request is generated. Figure 2 describes the referring 
mechanism in detail. 
Proceedings of the International MultiConference of Engineers and Computer Scientists 2009 Vol I
IMECS 2009, March 18 - 20, 2009, Hong Kong
ISBN: 978-988-17012-2-0 IMECS 2009  
 
Figure 1: Conference creation using conference factory 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Referring a user to conference 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 
II gives high level overview of the related work, section III 
investigates the problem, section IV describes the proposed 
solution while section V consists of validity and 
applicability of the proposed solutions. Section VI 
concludes the article.  
 
 
II. RELATED  WORK 
 
M. Sher et. al. in 2006 proposed a Transport Layer security 
(TLS) along with the intrusion detection system to secure 
the IMS application server against various types of time 
dependent and time independent attacks. Since SIP is 
mostly used with UDP so the implementation of TLS is an 
issue that needs to be resolved [2]. In 2006 Chen et. al. [3], 
Geneiatakis et. al. [4] and in 2007 Hunter et.al. [5] all 
investigated the SIP based flooding attacks and focuses on 
the need of some better solution against these attacks.   
Alam et.al. in 2006 purpose the idea of narrowcasting [6]. 
According to them instead of sending their communication 
to all the participants of the conference, each participant can 
configure his preferences that to whom he want to send his 
voice and to whom he don’t want to.  M. Sher et. al. in 2007 
developed an Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) 
system to secure the IMS application server. It is very 
difficult to maintain an up-to-date comprehensive list of 
rules. In this paper the main focus of the authors is on 
misuse detection only. The anomaly detection is not 
addressed [7]. 
 
 
III. PROBLEM  ANALYSIS 
 
There are many problems with the existing working 
mechanism of the conference service. A SIP based flood 
can be launched over the conference service by sending 
enormous number of invite requests. Since every invite 
request results in creation of a conference which require 
considerable amount of resources at the conference server 
so large number of invite requests may results in denial of 
service. Moreover internal threats like SQL injection etc. 
are also alarming and results in destruction at service level.  
 
Conference allows a single participant to invite anyone to 
the conference through refer request. Therefore an existing 
participant of the conference can invite such a person who 
is not acceptable by the other existing participants of that 
conference. Therefore the other participant may leave the 
conference due to the inclusion of a new member. So in 
short single participant based authority may results in 
conflict and dissatisfaction among the existing participants 
of the conference.  
 
Whenever a person is referred into the conference it 
becomes a fully authorized participant of that particular 
conference. Here fully authorized means that if it is a video 
conference than that participant has the full authority to 
watch, listen and speak. We can not restrict it to only watch 
or speak. In real life there are many scenarios where we 
need passive participants. Here passive means that the 
authority of those participants is limited. So this fully 
authorized mechanism reduces the applicability of the 
conference service in real life. 
 
IV. PRPOSED  SOLUTIONS 
 
In order to handle different types of flooding attacks and 
internal threats we developed an Intrusion Detection and 
Prevention (IDP) system. To reduce the chances of conflict 
among the existing participants of the conference service, 
we offer an election based distributed referring authority 
mechanism and to maximize the scope of the conference 
service in the real life we introduced the concept of 
parameterized referring. Details of the each solution are 
described as under: 
 
 
A.  Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) system:  
 
 
Flooding attacks and internal threats like SQL injection etc. 
are very alarming and require a comprehensive solution. 
We in this paper developed an IDP system to mitigate the 
effect of these attacks. This IDP system is deployed as a 
middle layer between IMS core and application plane. The 
distinct feature of this IDP system is that it includes both 
misuse detection and anomaly detection modules.  
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a) Misuse Detection Module: It is one of the main module 
of the proposed IDP system that detects the attack and 
penalize the attacker before serving the request. 
 
b) Attack Rules: It is the comprehensive list of the rules 
related to every type of possible attack. Rules are defined 
with respect to the role. 
 
c) Blacklist: It contains the list of the users who try to attack 
over the network. These users are blocked for particular 
period of time. 
 
d) Anomaly Detection: It inspects the effect of the request 
on the application server and tries to find the attack after the 
application server serves the request. Detail architecture of 
the middleware is given in the figure 4.  
 
When a request from a user reaches to the IMS core, S-
CSCF detects whether this request is for conference 
application server or not. If this request is for conference 
server than first it forwards towards the misuse detection 
module of the IDP system. This misuse detection module is 
equipped with the set of rules about each type of attack. 
This module after receiving the request first matches it with 
the blacklist. If that user’s ID exists in the blacklist the 
request is discarded. If the user does not exist in the 
blacklist then the misuse detection module matches it with 
the attack rules. If the request matches with any of the 
attack rules it is considered as an attack and discarded 
immediately. After discarding the requests the attacker is 
put into the blacklist for certain period of time. Here we 
also described the mechanism for the blacklist timings. The 
blacklist timings depend upon the attacker. If it is that 
particular user’s first attempt to attack, it is blacklisted for 
few minutes but if that user again tries to attack after 
getting out from the blacklist than it is blacklist timings are 
doubled from the previous timings.  For this purpose a 
counter is initialized for every attacker whenever it makes 
first attempt to attack. With every subsequent attack request 
the counter is incremented by one and the blacklist timings 
are doubled from the previous timings.  
 
If the request does not match with any of the attack rules it 
is considered as a legitimate request and forwards towards 
the conference server. Conference server serves the request. 
Since it is very rare that the misuse detection module is 
equipped with all the rules related to an attack, so it is 
possible that it fails to identify few attack requests. To 
handle this situation the anomaly detection module of the 
IDP comes into action. The server after serving the request 
sends its initial state (state before serving the request), 
current state (state after serving the request) and the request 
itself to the anomaly detection module of the IDP. Anomaly 
detection module verifies that whether the request did the 
same for which it is supposed to do. If request results in 
some undesirable action it is considered as an attack and the 
anomaly detection module updates the rules of the misuse 
detection module as well as ordered the misuse detection 
module to put the attacker into the blacklist. This feature 
limits the attacker to attack only once. If the attacker tries to 
repeat the same attack, misuse detection module will detect 
it due to the updation of the rules. The detailed architecture 
of the IDP system is shown in the figure 3.  
 
B.  Election Based Distributed Referring Authority:  
 
 
Conference service allows a single participant to refer 
anyone to the conference. Therefore a participant may refer 
such a person who is not acceptable by the other 
participants of the conference. This situation can result into 
conflict. In order to prevent the conference service from 
these types of conflicts and to create the friendly 
environment among the conference participants we 
developed an election based distributed referring authority 
mechanism. Whenever a participant wants to refer a person 
it initiates an election by sending a refer request to the 
conference server. Conference server starts polling by 
sending a Poll request to all the existing participant of the 
conference. All the participants are required to cast their 
vote either with “yes” or “no”. Yes for allowing the refer 
request and no to reject it. If a participant does not reply 
within the specified period of time it is automatically 
considered as “yes”. After receiving responses from all the 
participant or at the end of the specified time, the 
conference server counts the votes. If a certain percentage 
(i.e. 60%) of the members replied in “yes” the refer request 
is entertained else it is discarded and the initiator is notified. 
Initiator’s response is always counted as “yes”. Figure 4 
explains the scenario in details. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Architecture of Proposed Intrusion Detection and Prevention 
System 
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Figure 4: Election Based Distributed  Referring Authority Mechanism 
 
 
C. Parameterized  Refer  Request: 
 
 
Whenever a participant refers to some other person into the 
IMS conference, it becomes the fully authorized member of 
the conference. There are many scenarios where we want to 
invite few persons as a passive member of the conference. 
Here passive means that the participant is not fully 
authorized for all types of action. The authority of the 
participant is limited i.e. only to watch the conference 
(Listening and speaking is not allowed). To accommodate 
these types of scenarios in the IMS conference we proposed 
a parametrized refer request mechanism. Whenever a 
participant launches a refer request it also specify the 
authority of the referred user along with the refer request. 
Here authority represents the actions that referred 
participant can take (watching, listening, speaking etc.).   
The details are shown in the figure 5. This mechanism 
reduces the load from the network by allowing only few 
users to send the media. Scalability that is the major 
problem with the conference server can be achieved 
through this mechanism by adding more and more passive 
users. If all the participants are allowed to speak in a 
conference then the decision about turn to speak may 
results in conflict. Since this mechanism can also reduce the 
number of users allowed to talk so this problem can be 
solved up to great extent. 
 
Figure 5: Referred for Limited Access to the Conference  
 
V.      VALIDATION AND APPLICABILITY 
 
In order to validate the proposed solutions we deploy them 
over the prototype of the IMS testbed. First we deploy the 
IDP system over the testbed and launches different types of 
attacks. We found that every attack request that matches 
with the attack rules of the misuse detection module is 
discarded and that user is put into the blacklist. In few cases 
misuse detection module fails to detect an attack due to 
unavailability of rules. In this case anomaly detection 
module identifies the attack and put the attacker into 
blacklist through misuse detection module and updates the 
rules of the misuse detection module. After that we repeat 
the same attack and we find that this time the misuse 
detection component detects the attack. Figure 6 shows the 
IMS tesbed along with the IDP system.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: IMS testbed along with proposed IDP system  
 
 
 
First we configure set of attack rules against various types 
of attack at the misuse detection module of the IDP system. 
Few of the rules are given in simple text at below: 
  
1)  If a user sends more than 50 Invite requests within 60 
seconds consider it as Invite flooding attack 
2)  If a user sends more than 5 Refer requests in 60 
seconds consider it Refer flooding attack 
3)  If a request contains “Drop” consider it as SQL 
Injection attack 
 
After that we perform various experiments by sending 
different number and different types of requests.  The 
results are described in Table I.  
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Table I: Performance of the IDP System 
 
 
 
In the next experiment we evaluate our election based 
distributed referring authority mechanism. For this 
experiment the threshold value is set to 75%. We launched 
5 refer requests in a conference of 10 participants. Out of 
these 5 refer requests 3 got more than 75% votes so they 
became the member of the conference and the 2 requests 
fail to gain 75% vote so they are discarded by the 
conference server.  We repeat this experiment with different 
values and table 1 shows the results. 
 
Table I1: Election Based Referring 
 
 
 
In the last we identify few scenarios for the applicability of 
the parametrized refer request and validates the proposed 
mechanism in those scenarios. We take the Campus 
example where administration and the faculty members 
start a video conference to discuss few important issues. 
Latter on the president of the university referred few 
students into the conference but they were only allowed to 
watch and listen the conference. They were not allowed to 
speak in the conference. This feature is obtained through 
the parametrized refer request. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
IMS conference service is subject to various types of 
security attacks. To make this service more resilient against 
security threats we proposed intrusion detection and 
prevention system consists of misuse detection and 
anomaly detection components. To prevent the conflicts 
among the participants of the conference service an election 
based distributed referring authority mechanism is 
developed and at the end to enhance the applicability of the 
conference service in the real life we proposed a 
parametrized refer request.   
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